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The current business plan for the Amasaman Bus Rapid Transport corridor has provided for only 85 buses to be procured for the operations of the corridor. But government has signed a contract with Scania BV for the supply of 295 buses.

Though we know that some of these buses are meant for the Intercity STC, we are also aware that only 50 of those buses will be allocated to STC’s operations. Why is government therefore procuring 245 buses meant for BRT operations instead of the 85?

Available documentation also suggests that the price of each bus is very high and possibly overstated. In a cabinet memo from the Minister of transport, approved and sent to parliament, the total cost of the 295 buses was put at USD 110, 733.416. This means each bus is costing the taxpayer $375,376.51 (i.e 1, 502,550.04).
Meanwhile this cost did not include VAT, NHIL and custom duties.

Is Government therefore suggesting that the price of one bus is $375,367.51 which does not include statutory taxes and duties which will be borne or waived by Government?

Can the Government also explain its decision to sole source the procurement of these buses and not open it up to competitive tender?

On the March 19, 2014 Scania published on its external website that it had signed an agreement with the government to supply 300 buses for the BRT. How could government have signed an agreement with Scania without the necessary clearance from cabinet and parliamentary approval?

The Crown Agents who were engaged to undertake the value for money for the agreement is said to have raised significant queries to the contract. We request from government a copy of the queries raised by the VFM audit and the response provided by the government thereof.

We also request a full documentation covering the contract with Scania and the agreements that were sent to parliament for approval.

On other matters, information available to us also suggest that the current metro mass buses which have become a subject of branding and procurement controversy were initially imported from China for the BRT operations but were rejected by the current operators. These buses are alleged to have cost over $220,000 (GH880, 000) and are NOT BRAND NEW but home-made used buses.

Nine years ago, the government of the NPP led by President J.A Kufuor secured a $95m grant to amongst other things undertake institutional reforms in the transport sector by improving mobility while reducing transport sector contribution to greenhouse gas emissions. The major component of the Urban Transport Project (UTP) however was the implementation of a Bus Rapid Transport system running from Kasoa to the Central Business District of Accra.

Nine years down the line it appears the BRT has become a classic failure or will become a pale shadow of its potential operational glory. The BRT has joined the list of the many government’s mismanaged promises.
Indeed the Project Appraisal Document of the World Bank and the Credit Agreement covering the UTP suggests that the BRT should have been completed by December 2012.

Then Vice President Dramani Mahama promised the BRT was going to be ready by September 2012 when he cut the sod for the commencement of works for the BRT on the Graphic Road.

It is instructive to note that the original BRT as planned on the Kasoa-CBD corridor was abandoned because the government claimed there wasn’t enough funds to complete the needed infrastructure, despite the fact that the World Bank had made available $45m for this Project.

It has been alleged that the cost of the works at the Graphic Road, i.e. the construction of the flyover over the railway line and the expansion of the Odaw Bridge on the completion was more than three times the original contract value.

In 2012 the project shifted focus from the Kasoa-CBD corridor to the Amasaman corridor. It was believed that since the Kufuor Government had invested in and opened up the Achimota-Ofankor road network it was going to be possible and relatively easy to insert a functional BRT system with very minimal investments.

Unfortunately as we speak that project is far from completion, despite the siting of some bus stops along the corridor and the terminals at Amasaman and Achimota station. Indeed some of these bus stops have started falling apart, pointing to the shoddy nature of the work done.

Several promises made by the Mayor of Accra, Alfred Oko Vanderpuije, former Transport Minister Dzifa Attivor, the Chief Director of the Ministry and the President John Mahama on the completion of the BRT system have all not materialized.

The promises moved from June 2012, December 2012, March 2013, September 2013, June 2014, June 2015 and September 2015. All these dates have failed.

Recently, (January, 2016), the Chief Director of the Ministry of Transport came out to say the BRT would be launched in June 2016. Our investigations suggest that this date will also not be achieved.

Business Model/Government Policy

The other disturbing news is that government’s policy on urban transportation suggests that government will invest in infrastructure, the assemblies will regulate, civil society will advocate and the Private Sector will operate.

This means clearly that government will not get involved in the operations of public transport services but will allow private sector players like GPRTU to invest in and run the operations.

There are many successful examples in the world today and in Africa that show that private sector players have invested in and successfully run public transport operations. For instance LAMATA in Lagos has successfully operated this model and proven beyond reasonable doubt that it can be done. The Lagos State government through the Lagos Metropolitan Area Transport Authority (LAMATA) invested in the needed infrastructure and allowed private sector operators to take advantage of enabled environment to operate.

The business model developed for the UTP and BRT in Ghana followed similar arrangement.

Money was spent to engage consultants to develop a workable business case for the operations of the BRT in Ghana, and specifically for the Amasaman corridor. This business cases proved clearly that without government’s involvement, the private sector operators could invest in the BRT operations with support from local financial institutions to acquire the needed fleet with its attendants ticketing facilities and operate the system. Those operators could have broken even by the fifth year of operation and made huge profits after that. Additionally, the thought that ownership of the buses would revert to the operators boosted their confidence in the system, hence their willingness to support the BRT and participate in the operations. Even better news was the willingness expressed by local banks to make the finance needed available to the operators to acquire the fleet and the spare parts under special leasehold arrangements.

It is difficult therefore to understand government’s interference and onward obsession with the procurement of the buses for the BRT system. But it is also not difficult: “create, loot and share.”